Julia Otte, MSc.
PhD Candidate in Business Economics
Contact
(password for CV available upon request)



About Me
I am a PhD candidate in Management (Business Economics) at the Smith School of Business, Queen's University, specializing in theoretical modeling across dynamic pricing strategies and labor economics. My research explores how firms learn from market interactions, optimize product offerings and pricing, and foster inclusive workplaces in a dynamic environment.
Under the supervision of Dr. Veikko Thiele, I build on my Master's degree foundation from the same institution. I am currently teaching Managerial Economics in the commerce program of the Smith School of Business, Queen's University.
Dynamic Pricing & Returns
Analyzing how online retailers use product returns for customer segmentation and to optimize dynamic pricing, including the strategic use of return fees.
Subscription Boxes & Curated Retail
Examining subscription box services and curated shopping, focusing on balancing product variety with pricing strategies.
Workplace Inclusion & Identity
Developing a theoretical model of workplace inclusion and identity disclosure dynamics, considering firm policies, organizational memory, and social climate.
Current Research & Publications
Product Returns, Customer Segmentation, and Dynamic Pricing
Co-authored with Dr. Konstantinos Serfes and Dr. Veikko Thiele
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2025), 34(4), 899-917.
This paper analyzes how retailers optimize pricing strategies based on customer return behavior in online retail markets.
Product Variety and Dynamic Pricing in Subscription Box Services
Co-authored with Dr. Veikko Thiele
Working Paper
Examines optimal product variety, learning mechanisms, and dynamic pricing strategies for subscription box services.
The Impact of Social Climate Changes on Identity Disclosure and Inclusion in the Workplace
Work in Progress
Abstract:
Employees with concealable stigmatized identities (e.g., LGBTQ+ status, neurodivergence, invisible disabilities) choose how much to disclose at work, and firms decide how strongly to invest in inclusion programs. Both decisions are influenced by a shifting external social climate that neither party controls. I develop a two-period principal--agent model of this relationship. Identity disclosure cannot be fully retracted, as it persists in the organization's memory. I show that the firm may strategically provide high inclusion early on to incentivize disclosure, and then cut inclusion supports later. This allows the firm to extract surplus from the employee who is locked in by what is already known about her. Exploitation of this disclosure persistence can be optimal for the firm even in stable or improving social climates, when one would not expect disclosure irreversibility to matter. I also show that more organizational memory is not always worse for employees: the organization's memory can serve as an implicit commitment device, although the firm's preferred level of memory is always at least as high as the employee's.